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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR., TRUSTEE 
IN THE J\IATTER OF GEORGE RAY 
DUNHAM, VOLUNTARY 
BANKRUPT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA_ 
DUNHAM, HIS WIFE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9012 
PETITION FOR REI-IEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH: 
GEORGE R. DUNHAM and LEODA DUNHAM, 
defendants and respondents, respectfully request a re-
hearing in the above-entitled cause upon the following 
grounds: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS MISINTERPRETED THE RE.CORD. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING EQUITY APPEALS. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS FINDINGS 
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
Respondents respectfully submit that on each of the 
above grounds, the error of this court was decisive in its 
decision reversing the trial court. 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
Attorneys for Respondents 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS MISINTERPRETED THE RE.CORD. 
Under equity rules, this Court is entitled to examine 
the evidence and to determine both factual and legal 
matters on appeal. This Court in so doing has made 
completely new findings of fact, contrary to those of the 
trial court. In this re-exmnina tion, however, this Court 
has misinterpreted the testimony of Leoda Dunham. The 
only procedure which Respondent now has for pointing 
out this error is by a Petition for Rehearing, wherein 
the Court will have the opportunity to re-evaluate the 
evidence. 
This Court has found that the defendants' witnesses, 
attorney LaMar Duncan, Thomas Lefler, Cashier of the 
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Kamas State Bank, and also Leoda Dunham, defendant, 
have testified falsely with reference to the execution of 
the deed. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court 
strongly relies upon the alleged testimony that Leoda 
Dunham placed the property in joint tenancy because of 
her serious illness, that she, therefore, knew of the legal 
effects of joint tenancy and would have no reason fl)r 
placing the property in her own name. SUCH IS NOT 
A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF TH~J 
RECORD. 
The relevant paragraph of the Court's op1n1on 1s 
quoted below with the incorrect fact statements italicized: 
"A very strong reason for believing that the 
deed was made after the accident and not at the 
time it is dated is the fact that there is no reason 
whatever shown for making such a deed at the 
ttt'me. it was dated. This is equally true whether 
or not her claim is correct that she paid for the 
property out of her own separate funds. For until 
the accident in which the creditors were imjured 
occurred there was no reason for making the 
transfer and none has been suggested. She 
testified that although she. paid for the property 
out of her own separate. funds, she had it con-
veyed to her and her husband jointly because (1) 
she had ulcers of the stomach and vf anything 
happened to her she wan~ed him to get the prop-
erty; (2) it is customary for husband and wife to 
hold their property as joint tenants; and (3) she 
had no head for real estate so she turned it ove'r 
to htt"m, and the fact that he was drinking heavily 
at that time gave her no concern. The fact that 
she said she placed the property tt"n joint tenancy 
so he would get i't if anything happened to her 
indicates that she knew that the survivor of joint 
tenants would get the property on the death of 
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the other. If his heavy drinking was no concern 
to her, and she felt it safe to put her property in 
joint tenancy with him, then there was no reason 
to have him deed the property back to her merely 
because he had a heart attack. Because if he died, 
she knew that as a joint tenant she would become 
the sole owner of the property upon his death. 
The only excuse she gives for making this deed 
was her fear that he would have a heart attack 
and die. She does not claim that she had any fear 
that his drinking might cause an accident and 
make him liable to creditors, or that he might 
wrongfully encumber the property. So under her 
own understanding of joint tenancy there was no 
occasion whatever for making the deed to her at 
that time." 
To the contrary, the only evidence is Leoda 
Dunham's testimony to the effect that she had the prop-
erty placed in George Dunham's name alone because of 
her illness. I quote below the applicable portions of the 
record: (R. 64, 65) 
"DIRECT EXAMINATION, cont'd. 
"By Mr. Cassity: 
"Q. Mrs. Dunham, isn't it true that before the 
referee in bankruptcy that you testified that 
the uniform real estate contract under which 
you first took the property from Mrs. 
Kirkpatrick was placed in your husband's 
nmne, Mr. Dunham, alone, no other name 
being on it~ 
"A. I don't re1ne1nber that issue coming up about 
the real estate contract. 
"Q. Do you ren1ember, :.Mrs. Dunhmn, stating 
that-upon being questioned that the reason 
you had it put in your husband's name at 
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that time and his name alone was that you 
were ill~ 
"A. I remember telling you down there that I 
was ill. 
"Q. And did you state that - further that your 
illness consisted of bad ulcers~ 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Now, do you remember that you did put it 
in your husband's name alone originally~ 
"A. If I did, it was because of my illness at that 
time. I was very ill with ulcers at that time. 
"Q. So that when it was originally purchased, 
your husband's name alone was on the con-
tract of sale. Is that not true~ 
"A. Well, I don't know for sure whether it was 
or not, it has been so long, but I know that 
I was sick, and if his name was on there 
alone, that would be the reason for it. 
"Q. Do you remember this question being asked : 
'What was the reason the title was put in 
your husband's namef And your answer 
said, 'I had ulcers of the stomach, and I was 
very ill f 
"A. I remember that, yes. 
"Q. Do you remember the question, 'Did your 
physician expect those ulcers to be fatal f 
And you said, 'I don't know. I didn't know 
at any time what would happen. I was really 
sick~' 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And then you were asked, 'How long were 
you ill~' And you answered, 'I still have 
them ever since 1929 continuously since that 
period~' 
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"A. That's right. 
"Q. Do you have any other explanation for 
putting the property in his name after it 
was purchased alone the first time 1 
"A. No Sir." 
(R. 67, 68) 
" ... Q. Now, going to that experience wherein 
that took place, I refer you gack to this 
question that was asked which you said 
was your answer that you had very bad 
ulcers back in 1929, and that was the reason 
you put the property in Mr. Dunham's name 
in the first place and that you have had very 
bad ulcers ever since. 
"A. Yes, they had been bad but not nearly as bad 
as they were before because I have watched 
my diet considerable. 
"Q. I see, Now, did anybody ever explain to you 
what joint tenancy means 1 
"A. Well, not fully, no. 
"Q. Do you have any reason why the property 
was taken from your husband's name and 
put in your name and his name? Did you 
have some reason for that that you can 
recollect? 
"A. Well, no, not other than that I was ill. That's 
the only reason that I remember, and that 
he was n1ore capable of doing it probably 
than I was at that ti1ne. 
"Q. I arn speaking of the time when the property 
was put in both your names, taken from 
his to both your names. 
"A. Will you repeat the question? 
"Q. Pardon? 
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"A. Will you repeat the question then, please. I 
misunderstood. 
"Q. Do you remember what your reason was for 
doing that~ 
"A. What my reason was for having it in joint 
tenancy~ 
"Q. Yes. 
"A. The only reason I can say is I think it is 
customary for husband and wife to have 
those things done in their two names isn't 
it~ I have always understood. I know my 
mother and father used to anything like that 
they have. 
"Q. Now, what was the reason that you put the 
property from both names into just your 
name~ 
"A. Mr. Dunham's illness. 
"Q. And what did that have to do with it~ 
"A. Well, he was-he has a very bad heart, and 
be blacked out several times. In fact, one 
Sunday he blacked out several times, and he 
was under surveillance of the doctors, under 
Doctor Nuttall, and he had frequent heart 
attacks, blacked completely out. 
"Q. Did this worry you with respect to the prop-
erty~ 
"A. Yes, it did." 
Therefore, it is very clear and uncontradicted that 
Leoda Dunham had the property placed in her husband'g 
name originally in 1944 because of her serious illness. 
It was later placed in joint tenancy in 1951 because she 
thought it customary to have property in the name of 
the husband and wife, since that was how her mother 
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and father held their property. She then had it trans-
ferred to herself alone and out of the joint tenancy 
when she believed that George's death was near. In 
other words, one reaches an exactly opposite conclusion 
from that of the Court. There was a reason to have the 
property placed in her name in 1952, i.e., George's 
possible death, which reason was consistent with her 
reason for putting the property in George's name alone 
in 1944. 
The statements I have italicised in the Court's 
opinion are not supported by the evidence and the Court 
should not reasonably infer that Leoda Dunham knew 
she would become the sole owner of the property under 
a joint tenancy upon the death of George. She had no 
such understanding of joint tenancy and, the Court erred 
in so holding. Should we not, therefore, rely upon the 
evidence set forth in the record as heard and observed 
by the trial judge~ If this Court's "strong reason" for 
disbelieving the defendants' witnesses is now abandoned, 
there is no basis for the Court's opinion. There certainly 
is clear and convincing evidence that the deed was exe-
cuted. It is not equitable to deprive Leoda Dunham of her 
property upon such a n1isinterpretation of the evidence. 
Again on Page 3 of its opinion, the Court relies upon 
a rnissappraisal of the record, by stating in the third 
paragraph: 
"ShortlY after the deed fr01n 1\Ir. Dunham to 
l\frs. Dunha~n was recorded on November 27,1953, 
another rnortgage was n1ade by the Dunhams to 
the bank, dated April 1:2, 195±. In this mortgage 
her name is first, and onl~T :Mrs. Dunham signed 
this mortgage. No reason w·hatever is given why 
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the cashier of the bank took a mortgage from Mr. 
Dunham with his name appearing first on the 
mortgage at a time when he knew that he had 
deeded away all of his interest in the property.'' 
Contrary to this statement, the record, at Page 97, 
98, shows the following: 
"Q. Now, just a moment. Didn't you say that 
Mr. and Mrs. Dunham signed this mortgage1 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Now you are saying that you loaned it to 
~irs. Dunham~ 
"A. The property at that time was in both names. 
"Q. Did you see the-yes. Now, who did you loan 
the money to~ 
"A. Well, I loaned it to Mrs. Dunham. She gener-
ally does all the speaking. 
"Q. Is she the only wife of all the husbands and 
wives that deal with you that deal for the 
husband~ 
"A. Many of the wives do. 
"Q. Then how is it that you think you loaned the 
money to Mrs. Dunham when you made both 
of them sign the mortgage~ 
"A. Because I have to have both of them sign 
the mortgage at that time when it was in 
both names. 
"Q. But you think you loaned the money to Mrs. 
Dunham~ 
"A. Yes sir. She was the spokesman. I don't 
know what they did before they came, but 
she does all the talking when she comes into 
the bank. 
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"Q. Now, Mr. Lefler, you say that you under-
stand - you understood that though you 
loaned the money after both of them signed 
the mortgage, you understood that they had 
a deed which put the property in Mrs. Dun-
ham's name~ 
"A. I knew of it, yes. She had told me of it. 
"Q. Did you see it? 
"A. No ... " 
(R. 100, 101) 
" 
"A. 
. Q. In other words, simply because she 
claimed she owned the property didn't dis-
turb you~ 
I follow the records of the county. 
"Q. So you didn't rely on her statements? 
"A. Not necessarily. If our attorney gives us 
his opinion that the title is clear and corres-
ponds with our note, that is all we ask for. 
"Q. Now, let me ask another question. You pre-
pared a mortgage a month or so before the 
accident which both Mr. and Mrs. Dunham 
executed, the property being found by your 
abstracter to be in the names of both. Is 
that true? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Then just a matter of a few months after 
that when the property was recorded in the 
name of one of the parties, you executed a 
new mortgage which again you had both 
parties sign. \Vhat was the reason for that~ 
"A. As I stated before, we had them sign because 
we don't want to take any chance of any 
prior lien that Inay be in the case of the 
husband, although the wife does have the 
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right to own property. Many cases we have 
the husband sign. 
Yes, but you have already pointed out that 
he had already signed. What was the pur-
pose in him signing twice~ 
What I say, we recorded this new one to 
bring it in line with the records of the county. 
"Q. And you wanted a new mortgage after the 
new deed had been recorded. Is that it~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. But you still wanted Mr. Dunham to sign it~ 
"A. We had him sign it, yes, for our protection .. " 
The record, at Page 105, shows the following: 
" ... Q. Well, now, Mr. Lefler, isn't it contrary 
to your practice as a bank official to have 
somebody come to you and ask for a mort-
gage and tell you that the property is 
recorded in two names but actually belongs 
to another person, one of those two persons 
individually, is that your practice to loan 
money under those circumstances~ 
"A. It's-can I answer that in my own way~ 
"Q. Yes, please. 
"A. In approaching individuals for loans, we 
take the application, we submit it to the 
attorney and abstractor, they determine 
whose name the property has and is re-
corded. Then it comes back to us with that 
information. We proceed, and we get the 
mortgage with those signatures, those people 
giving the mortgage. 
"Q. In other words, it doesn't matter whether 
the applicant for the loan told you - you 
answer this 'yes' or 'No' - it doesn't matter 
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to you what they tell you; the only thing 
you go by is by the record. Is that true? 
"A. Both. 
"Q. Weren't you concerned at all about her tell-
ing you that it was her property alone when 
you loaned her this money~ 
"A. I think we are protected by the records of 
the county. 
"Q. So you weren't concerned then. Is that it? 
"MR. PRA·T·T: I object to that, Your 
Honor. 
"A. I don't remember. 
"MR. PRATT: That is not what he 
testified to. 
"MR. CASSITY: I am asking him to 
say 'Yes' or 'No'. He didn't answer my 
question. 
"THE COURT: I think he can answer 
it 'Yes' or 'No'. 
"Q. Were you or weren't you? 
"A. We are always, yes, we are concerned, sure. 
"Q. Why did you loan the money if you were 
concerned~ 
"A. I don't recall the details of it, but I do know 
that I checked with the abstracter. If it was 
her's or whose it was or both of them signed 
at that ti1ne, it would be all right ... " 
Mr. Lefler testified above to the effect that he relied 
upon the record ti tie, \Yhich procedure was and is well 
accepted as a n1atter of proper legal and practical dealing 
wjth real propert)~. Also, he testified in the answer to 
the last question above, to the effect that whether it was 
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her's or George's property by reason of the unrecorded 
deed, both had signed the mortgage and it was, therefore 
proper. In view of this testimony, it is not reasonable for 
this court to say that "no reason whatever" is given 
for Mr. Lefler's action in handling the mortgage trans-
action in this manner. 
The foregoing n1isinterpretations of the evidence, 
i.e., the joint tenancy problem and the mortgage problem, 
are major joints of reliance by this Court in rendering 
its opinion This incorrect factual basis should not and 
cannot exist as an equitable foundation for an opinion, 
which deprives Leoda Dunham of her property. For this 
reason and because there are additional errors in the 
record citation, this Court should reconsider this case 
and the evidence. This rehearing is the only procedure 
available to Petitioners whereby review can be had of 
this Court's alleged errors in its equitable fact :finding. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING EQUITY APPEALS. 
This Court, in its opinion, has completely disre-
garded its duty, as enunciated in its prior decisions, to 
give credence and dignity to the trial court's :findings. 
This Court has repeatedly held that on appeal, it must 
strongly consider the trial court's opportunity to see, 
hear and appraise the witnesses as they testify. Particu-
larly is this rule applicable where the evidence consists 
primarily of the oral testimony of the witnesses. 
The more recent cases and some of the statements 
of this Court setting forth this rule are cited below: 
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Walton·v. Koffman, 110 Utah 1. The Court states: 
"As above stated, this is an equity case, 
(cases cited). It is, therefore, our duty to carefully 
examine the record and make an independent 
determination of what the facts are. In so doing, 
we should keep in mind that the trial judge saw 
and heard the witnesses and observed their de-
meanor and was acquainted with the circum-
stances surrounding the giving· of their testimony, 
and, therefore, was in a better position than we 
are to weigh and evaluate their evidence. (cites 
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in 
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 527, 94 P. 2d 465)." 
I quote from said concurring opinion : 
"In short, as held in Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 
Utah 503, 56 P. 2d 1, if after we review the record 
we can not say that the court came to a wrong 
conclusion, we should affirm. We do not reverse 
if we find the court's findings supported by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence, or if supported 
only by a slight preponderance or if the evidence 
is evenly balanced, or even if there is in the record 
a slight preponderance the other way, for the 
reasons above set out." 
The reasons above set out are in part as follows: 
"Our duty is to make an independent exami-
nation of the record. If after that, we find (1) 
the preponderance of the evidence supports the 
trial court's findings of fact; or, (2) if there is 
doubt in our 1ninds as to "\Yhere the preponderance 
lies, or ( 3) we think the evidence as revealed by 
the record n1a~T slightly preponderate against its 
conclusions but snrh preponderance may well be 
offset in favor of his conclusions by having seen 
the witnesses and been able to judge by their 
demeanor as to their credibility, then we will not 
reverse ... " 
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In Nokes v. Contznental Mining and MiUing Corn-
pany, 6 Utah 2d 177, 178, this court, through Justice 
Crockett, states the following: 
"[1, 2] This being a case in equity, it is our 
responsibility to review the evidence. In doing 
so it is well to have in mind the general pattern 
as to the scope of such review as set out in prior 
adjudications in this court. Where there is a 
conflict in the evidence, -the finding of the trial 
court will not be disturbed if the evidence pre-
ponderates in favor of the finding; nor, if the 
evidence therein is evenly balanced or it is doubt-
ful where the preponderance lies; nor, even if its 
weight is slightly against the finding of the trial 
court, but it will be overturned and another 
finding made only if the evidence clearly pre-
ponderates against his finding. 
"[3] The rule just stated is based upon the 
sound reasoning that some credit should be in-
dulged in favor of the findings of the trial court 
because of the advantages peculiar to his position 
in immediate contact with the trial. It is indeed 
often true that, 'the manner hath more eloquence 
than naked words portend.' There are intangibles 
of expression and attitude which give color and 
meaning not apparent from words alone. The trial 
judge feels the impact of the personalities of the 
parties and the witnesses : He is able to observe 
their appearance and behavior; their forthright-
ness or hesitancy in answering; their frankness 
and candor, or lack of it. Similarly revealing to 
him are indications of surprise, anger, resentment 
or vindictiveness, pleasure or other emotions 
which may be discerned from expressions of the 
countenance or voice. He also has some advantage 
in appraising their abilities to understand and 
their capacities to remember. Furthermore, he is 
in a position to question the witness himself to 
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clarify doubtful points or verify his impressions 
on the matters just mentioned. All of this com-
bines to afford him better insight as to the truth-
fulness of the testimony offered than does a 
perusal of the cold record. It is a sound and well 
recognized policy of the law to repose some con-
fidence in the verity of the actions of the trial 
court, and not to interfere with them unless it 
clearly appears that he is in error." 
Again, in a more recent case, Child v. Child, 8 Utah 
2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981, this court again, through Justice 
Crockett, says : 
"[2] Passing upon the credibility of witnesses 
involves to some extent the judgment of what 
goes on in the minds of others and is therefore 
fraught with uncertainty. Whether one believes a 
witness is telling the truth often depends as much 
or more upon the impression the witness is making 
as upon the words he says. His appearance and 
demeanor, his manner of expression and tone of 
voice, his apparent frankness, or candor, or the 
want of it; his forthrightness in answering, or 
his tendency to hesitate or evade, and in fact his 
whole personality go into the composite effect of 
the testimony. This is so even though the hearer 
may not be paying particular attention to nor 
separately evaluating such factors. In addition to 
the personality aspects involved in the interpre-
tation and evaluation of testimony, there are also 
difficulties to be encountered because of the un-
certainties found in fact situations themselves 
which must be correlated to the testimony of the 
witnesses. We have heretofore pointed out the 
trial court's advantages in judging the credibility 
of witnesses and determining the facts. It is du~ 
to these considerations that it is firmlY established 
that passing on such 1natters is exclu~ively within 
his province ... " 
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" ... [6-8] It is not required that the trial 
judge's view of the evidence be that which the 
justices, or any particular justice, of this court 
would have taken of it. There is the practical 
necessity of making allowance for his advantaged 
position and indulging some latitude for his per-
sonal reactions and reasoning with respect thereto, 
even though they may not fit the exact pattern 
of our own. In reviewing the appraisal he make:S 
we can only apply the standard of reasonablenes~, 
as it appears to us: this entails application of a 
rule that is admittedly, but necessarily, not as 
precise as might be desired: if the evidence in 
favor of his finding appears to be such that 
reasonable minds acting fairly, reasonably and 
in good conscience could regard it as being clear 
and convincing, as the ordinary meaning of those 
words imply, the finding should not be disturbed. 
Inasmuch as the burden rests upon the defendants 
to demonstrate that the trial court was in error, 
the findings and judgment should not be disturbed 
unless we can say affirmatively, and with some 
degree of assurance, that there is no reasonable 
basis in the evidence upon which he could fairly 
and rationally have thought that the requisite 
degree of proof, i.e., by clear and convincing evi-
dence, was met ... " 
Our case is a most graphic example of the necessity 
for strict adherence to this rule. Here all of the material 
evidence concerning fraud, the execution of the ques-
tioned deed, etc., is by oral testimony. Mr. Duncan, the 
attorney, Mr. Lefler, the banker, Leoda Dunham, one 
of the defendants, and George Dunham, the other de-
fendant, all testified. The trial court heard and observed 
these witnesss as they testified and chose to believe the 
first three witnesses, giving little weight or emphasis tc 
the testimony of George Dunham. The trial court ob-
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served the demeanor of the defendant, George Dunham, 
and the many statements wherein he was vague or could 
not remember details (R. 15-17). The following portions 
of the record are fairly representative of the situation 
presented to the trial court as Mr. Dunham testified: 
Record, Page 19 : 
" . A. I am sixty-two, Your Honor. I'm not 
trying to foul up the court, Your Honor. 
Since that accident I don't remember some 
of these things, Your Honor. I'm not trying 
to foul up anything. 
"THE COURT: You were hurt your-
self? 
"A. I was hurt, and I have a blood clot, and in 
the summertime it knocks - looks at my 
hands, broken, every time I fall. I can't help 
it. I just don't remember those things ... " 
Record, Page 28 : 
"THE COURT: Now, let me interrupt 
enough to say this, that I don't believe this 
witness's memory according to him is suffi-
cient to hold Mr. Duncan longer. If you wish 
to put Mr. Duncan on the stand, you may 
withdraw this witness to put him on ... " 
Record, Page 138 : 
" ... Q. In the management of the property up 
there, just what specifically has George done 
throughout the years? 
"A. George helps out with a little repair work. 
He sells a few bottles of beer. He isn't able 
to do 1nuch. He was so badly crippled that 
he's not been able to do much, and he was 
sick before that with a heart condition. 
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"Q. When you say 'crippled,' in what way is he 
crippled~ 
"A. Well, his hip is completely gone, and his left 
arm is completely demolished, and he had 
all of his jaws broken, jaws broken on both 
sides of his face, and nearly every bone in 
the body, I suppose the greater majority was 
broken. 
"Q. And when did this happen~ 
"A. That was on November 8, 1953 ... " 
Record, Page 51 : 
" ... THE COURT: I have a question, 
sir. Wer~ you in the hospital after you were 
in an accident~ 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"THE COURT: How long were you in 
the hospital~ 
"A. Oh, off and on for three and a half years ... " 
The foregoing excerpts from the record do not show 
a witness upon which this Court should rely - whose 
testimony could be considered "clear and convincing" 
evidence that the deed was not executed. Nor can he be 
deemed reliable, when, within two months after trial, 
he shot Leoda Dunham, her mother and brother at Camp 
Killkare and is now committed to the State Mental 
Hospital. The trial court did not think the testimony 
was reliable and counsel for defendants did not think 
so and did not call Mr. Dunham as a witness nor cross-
examine him. Mr. Dunham's disabilities are apparent to 
all who observe him in his actions and speech. 
This Court apparently ignores these matters and 
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places great emphasis on the statement of George Dun-
ham, "it could very well be." At Page 3 in the first full 
paragraph, the opinion states in part: 
" ... Then in answer to the question: ' ... Isn't 
it true that Mr. Duncan brought this (the deed) 
to you in November of 1953, when you were in the 
Veterans' Hospital after the accident that you 
had when you injured yourself and Mr. Sizemore 
and l\1r. Garrett~ ... Isn't that the place and the 
time that you signed this document .. ~' He said: 
'It could very well be.' 
The Court relies upon this statement even though 
in the testimony imn1ediately preceding and immediately 
after said statement, Mr. Dunham states that he doeB 
not know where or when he signed the deed. 
A more patent disregard of the trial court's ap-
praisal of the witnesses would be difficult to find. Since 
there is no review of this court's findings, other than 
by this Petition for Rehearing, it is equitable and in 
harmony with this Court's prior rulings to follow the 
trial court's appraisal of the individual characteristics 
of the witnesses and the manner in which they testified. 
This Court makes inference after inference of fraud 
based upon portions of the testin1ony which it finds in-
consistent or which it believes is questionable because 
of the veracity of the witnesses. All of these inferences 
are contrary to the trial court's findings and nowhere is 
~ny consideration gi,~en to the trial court's more favorable 
opportunity to observe the witnesses. Smne of the more 
obvious of these instances are hereinafter n1entioned: 
(a) In paragraph 1, page 2 of the Opinion, the 
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Court relies upon the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Dunharn, 
indicating the income each was making. At the same 
time, testimony of these witnesses indicating that Leoda 
purchased the property while George drank up his wages, 
was completely rejected. This later is the only testimony 
to show how the property was purchased and this Court 
gives it no weight. (R. 24, 60) 
(b) In paragraph 2, page 2 of the Opinion, the 
Court recites that various deeds and mortgages were 
executed by both George and Leoda Dunham, that the 
sales of the properties were largely negotiated by him 
and that he never suggested to any of the purchasers 
that Leoda was the owner of the property. The Court 
then concludes that these actions indicated George was 
at least an equal owner with Leoda in the property. The 
Court makes this conclusion notwithstanding the exten-
sive testimony of both Leoda Dunham and Tom Lefler 
indicating that Leoda was the person who handled the 
property, that George was given the right to negotiate 
in some instances, that the record title required the 
execution of the deeds and mortgages by both George 
and Leoda. (R. 66, 72, 75) All of this testimony by Leoda 
Dunham and by Mr. Lefler is completely rejected appar-
ently upon the basis that the witnesses' credibility is 
challenged by this Court. There is no other evidence 
controverting this testimony. 
(c) In paragraph 2, page 3 of the Opinion, the 
Court sets forth as a "doubtful circumstance" the infer-
ence that since all of the deeds and mortgages, other 
than the deed in question, were drawn by the bank's 
officers, the deed in question was not executed prior to 
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the accident. Again, this Court has completely rejected 
the testimony appearing at Pages 89, 94, 95 and 139 of 
the record, wherein Leoda Dunham and Mr. Lefler, in 
great detail, explain that all of the money went to pay 
the mortgage at the bank because of assignments it held 
and that the bank prepared all of the various documents, 
having a substantial interest in the closing of each 
transaction. It certainly is more reasonable to accept 
such testimony than to ignore it or to infer from it the 
commission of acts of fraud. 
(d) In paragraph 2, page 3 of the Opinion, this 
Court points to the statement of Mr. Layton as having 
little weight as evidence that the deed was made prior 
to the accident. 
The Court, however, fails to mention Mr. Layton's 
statement that these conversations occurred about a year 
before the accident (R. 150) and appears to ignore the 
inconsistencies existing in his testimony which led the 
trial court to eliminate this evidence from its considera-
tion. (R. 155) 
(e) In the last paragraph on page 3 of the Opinion, 
the Court concludes that half of the property is George's. 
There is no evidence that George owned half of the 
property or any specific portion of the property and 
such conclusion is 1nanifestly unsupported by the evi-
dence. 
POINT III. 
THE ,COURT HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS FINDINGS 
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
If we now look at the recital of facts and inferences 
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therefrom made by this Court, there is no clear and 
convincing evidence that the deed was not executed on 
the date it bears, that Leoda Dunham and her husband 
George fraudulently placed the property in Leoda's 
name and that George now owns one-half of the property. 
The evidence which this Court has found as a basis 
for determining that the deed was not executed November 
1, 1952, is shown hereafter: 
(a) The most important point relied upon by the 
Court and concerning Leoda Dunham's understanding of 
joint tenancy (4th para. pg. 2 of Opinion) is disposed 
of under Point I above. 
(b) The next point being Mr. Dunham's statement, 
"it could very well be" (para. 1, pg. 3 of Opinion), in 
view of the uncertainty of his testimony and of the 
nature of his personality can hardly be termed as "clear 
and convincing evidence." 
(c) The fact that Dunhams went to Mr. Duncan 
and not to the bank (para. 2, pg. 3 of Opinion) shows 
no fraud nor anything to indicate the deed was not 
executed that day. The Kirkpatrick to Dunham deed was 
prepared by Harlan Clark in January of 1951. The 
George to Leoda deed on November 1, 1952, was the first 
transaction thereafter relating to the property. It was 
natural for the Dunhams to again go to an attorney, 
since this deed had nothing to do with the bank, with any 
assignment of monies from the sale of the property: 
nor with any releases of mortgage. 
(d) .It certainly is consistent for the Dunhams to 
both say that they did not discuss joint tenancy with Mr. 
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Duncan (para. 2, pg. 3 of Opinion) and for Mr. Duncan 
to say that joint tenancy was not discussed, but that it 
wouldn't make any difference anyway since he did not 
believe in joint tenancy. These statements show nothing 
with reference to the execution of the deed. 
(e) Mr. Duncan said he probably (R. 40) told the 
Dunhams to record the deed (para. 2, pg. 3 of Opinion), 
but Mrs. Dunham did not do so for over a year. Clear 
and convincing evidence should not be predicated upon 
such indefiniteness as the phrase "probably told," as 
testified to by Mr. Duncan. One has only to see and hear 
Mrs. Dunham to realize her homespun and unassuming 
personality, and to believe that she was sincere in saying 
that she did not record the document because she was 
busy and did not realize it had to be recorded. (R. 72) 
The Court recognizes (para. 2, pg. 3 of Opinion) 
that none of these incidents singly were strong proof 
that the deed was not exeucted. Certainly putting these 
three fact incidents together, do not make any more 
clear and convincing, the claim of fraud. 
"Two other claims in favor of the Dunhams" (para. 
3, pg. 3 of Opinion) are apparently not relied upon as 
proof of the fraud, but merely to show weakness in the 
defendants' proof. Neither of these two points add much 
to plaintiff's case. The actions of ~Ir. Lefler are certainly 
reasonabl~r explained at great length (R. 97, 98, 100, 101, 
105) and the statements of 1\Ir. Layton admittedly add 
nothing to the case. However, the v-ery inclusion of these 
two points in this opinion indicate the Court's reliance 
to smne extent in making inferences from the facts 
therein set forth. 
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Therefore, paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) above 
include all of the evidence stated by this Court to show 
a case of fraud, supposedly by clear and convincing 
evidence. In the case of Child v. Child, supra, recently 
decided by this Court, is a clear and extensive definition 
of the "clear and convincing evidence" rule. To reverse 
and to make findings in this equity case, as it has now 
done, this Court must be convinced that there is no 
reasonable basis in the record to support the lower 
court's findings that the deed was executed and that there 
was no fraud. Such a burden does not appear to have 
been sustained in this Court's opinion. 
Finally with reference to the finding that George 
Dunham owns one-half of the property, there appears 
to be no evidence upon which such a finding can be made. 
If Leoda and George are sustained in their testimony 
concerning payment for the property, then Leoda without 
a doubt owns the property in her own name. If the 
Court does not believe these witnesses with reference to 
the payments made for the property, then there is no 
evidence whatsoever to indicate how the property has 
been paid for and to further indicate the proportionate 
amount of payment borne by each. If a rehearing is not 
permitted, the case should nevertheless be remanded for 
the lower court to now determine the respective interests 
of these defendants. 
SUMMARY 
Leoda Dunham is the owner and manager of the 
property. She is an honest, straight forward, hard 
working and sincere wife. George Dunham on the other 
hand, as is shown by the testimony and by his commit-
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ment ·to the State Mental Hospital, was physically and 
mentally uncertain. One can only form such a contrasting 
opinion of these two defendants by seeing them and 
talking with them. One has only to see and talk with 
Thomas Lefler, the cashier of the bank, to know his sin-
cerity and trustworthiness. This Court, however, is not 
able to pass upon these traits of the witnesses, since it 
has had no opportunity to observe these witnesses. Not-
withstanding this lack of intimate contact so necessary 
to a trial court in determining the veracity of witnesses, 
this Court has decided that these witnesses testified 
falsely. Such a determination, so far removed from the 
scene of trial, should be subject to re-examination by this 
Court in view of the lack of supporting evidence. Leoda 
Dunham, by this opinion, will have one-half of her prop-
erty and in effect, a substantial, if not entire means 
of support taken from her without the opportunity of a 
review of these factual determinations by this Court. 
It is submitted that in all fairness and under reason-
able and equitable principles, this Court should re-
examine the evidence and thereupon affirm the trial court 
in its findings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & :ME·CHAM 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
Attorneys for Defendavnts 
and Respondents 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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